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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants do not have standing, as will be 
discussed below. Absent that fact, jurisdiction would 
be appropriate pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102 (3) (j). The case was assigned to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) (j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should the Appellants' case be dismissed for 
lack of standing? 
The traditional rule to determine standing requires 
that 1) the interests of the parties must be adverse; 
and 2) the parties seeking relief must have a legally 
protectable interest in the controversy. See, Forsberg 
v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146, P8, 184 
P.3d 610, 612. 
2. Did the trial court appropriately strike the 
~ Duane Boren Jr.' s declaration opposing the Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
The standard of review for striking a declaration 
is abuse of a broad grant of discretion. See, Murdock 
v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, P25, 982 P.2d 
1 
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65, 72; and Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. 
Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, P4, 314 P.3d 1069, 1071. 
3. Did the trial court properly grant summary 
judgment, dismissing the Plaintiffs' Complaint where 
all the Plaintiffs admitted, under oath, that they had 
no facts to support their complaint? 
The standard of review is correctness. See, Helf 
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, P46, 361 P.3d 63, 
73-74. 
4 . Did the trial court properly award the 
Defendants legal fees, based on Utah Code Ann. §75-7-
1004? 
The standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, P20, 89 P.3d 148, 152. 
5. Should the Appellees be awarded reasonable 
attorney fees incurred on appeal, as they were awarded 
fees at the trial court? 
The settled rule is that the appellate court will 
award the prevailing party the fees incurred on appeal 
when the party was awarded fees at the trial court. 
Warner v. Warner, 2014 UT App 16, P63, 319 P. 3d 711, 
732. 
2 
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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-104: 
In a judicial proceeding involving the 
administration of a trust, the court may, as 
justice and equity may require, award costs and 
expenses including reasonable attorney's fees, 
to any party, to be paid by another party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Duane Boren, Sr., (hereinafter 
"Mr. Boren") husband of Defendant Sherron L. Boren 
(hereinafter "Mrs. Boren") and father of the Plaintiffs 
and Defendant David Boren, died on December 27, 1992. 
R. 139-142. The probate court, based on Mr. Boren' s 
will, transferred various assets into a trust Mr. Boren 
had created. R. 168, 175. The income beneficiary of 
the trust was Mrs. Boren, and David was the trustee. 
R. 139. 
Over 20 years later, the Plaintiffs sued their 
brother David and their mother, alleging on 
"information and belief" that David and Mrs. Boren had 
stolen and embezzled assets from the trust, forged 
documents, failed to account; and that David had 
3 
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coerced his mother, commingled property and failed to 
administer the trust in a prudent manner. R. 1-11. 
Proceedings Below: Defendants, David and Mrs. 
Boren, both filed answers to the Plaintiffs' Complaint ~ 
and initial disclosures consisting of accountings, tax 
returns, inventory information and back up documents. 
David and Mrs. Boren also deposed the Plaintiffs. R. 
18-24, 30-35 and 41. The Plaintiffs elected not to 
depose David, but did depose Mrs. Boren 
In their depositions, the Plaintiffs all admitted 
that they had no facts to support the allegations in ~ 
their Complaint. They all indicated they had not 
looked at the tax returns and annual accountings, which 
had been provided to them prior to the lawsuit being 
filed. R. 82-98, 99-109, 110-117, and 118-129. 
After discovery was completed, David and Mrs. Boren 
moved for summary judgment. R. 64. Plaintiff, Duane 
Boren, Jr. (hereinafter "Junior") then filed a 
declaration, attempting to raise issues of fact to 
prevent summary judgment. R. 214. Junior's 
4 
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declaration contradicted his own deposition testimony, 
as well as that of the other Plaintiffs. None of the 
other Plaintiffs attempted to withdraw or change their 
testimony that they had no facts to support the 
allegations in their Complaint. 
David and Mrs. Boren moved to strike Junior's 
declaration. R. 612. 
Disposition at the Trial Court: The trial court 
struck Junior's declaration and granted the motion for 
summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. R. 710-
719. The court also awarded the Defendants legal fees, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-7-1004. R. 815-819. 
FACTS 
1 . Mr. and Mrs. Boren had six children: Plaintiffs 
Sharrol Anderton, Mary Blanchard, Terry Christensen, 
Junior, Defendant David, and Lucky Boren. Lucky died 
on April 1, 2001. Deel. of Sherron Lea Boren. R. 139-
142. 
2. Mr. and Mrs. Boren prepared the Master Trust 
Agreement and a Joinder Agreement The Duane Boren 
5 
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Family Living Trust (hereinafter "Trust"), dated March 
20, 1980. The only asset in the trust when it was 
created was a life insurance policy. R. 139-142. 
3. Paragraph 6.22 of the Duane Boren Family Living 
Trust ("Trust") granted Mrs. Boren broad powers of 
appointment entitling her to change the provisions of 
the Trust at any point and in any manner that she 
chose, after the death of Mr. Boren. R. 150. 
4 . On January 25, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Boren signed 
an Amendment to the Duane Boren Family Living Trust. 
Paragraph 4 of the Trust appointed Mrs. Boren as 
trustee. Later, Mr. Boren crossed out Mrs. Boren's 
name and wrote in David Boren (hereinafter "David"). 
R. 139-142, 161-163. 
5. On August 28, 1990, Mr. Boren signed a Second 
Amendment to the Trust, designating David as successor 
trustee and changing the distribution of the assets. 
R. 139-142, and 164-167. 
6. After Mr. Boren's death, on December 27, 1992, 
the family met, the will was read, and all family 
members were provided a copy of the will and Trust. R. 
134-138, 139-142. ~ 
6 
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7. Mr. Boren' s estate was probated in Duchesne 
County, Utah. Mrs. Boren was appointed personal 
representative; based on the terms of Mr. Boren's will, 
the assets were distributed to David as Trustee of the 
Trust. R. 139-142. 
8. According to the terms of the Trust, after Mr. 
Boren's death, the Trust was divided in half with Mrs. 
Boren owning an undivided one half interest 
properties, and the other one half interest 
Trust was distributed to David as the Trustee. 
155. 
in the 
of the 
R. 147-
9. The properties distributed to the Trustee were 
real estate, some farm equipment, and mineral and 
surface rights. Deel. of Sherron Lea Boren with 
attached Distribution Order. R. 139-142. 
10. The Trust assets were to be used for the 
benefit of, and at the direction of Mrs. Boren, during 
her life. R. 139-142, and 166. 
11. From 1993 to the present, David, as trustee, 
has managed the Trust properties as well as the 
properties owned by his mother, Mrs. Boren. She has 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been actively involved in the decisions regarding the 
Family Trust and its assets. Deel. of David L. Boren 
and Deel. of Sherron Lea Boren. 
142. 
R. 134-138, and 139-
12. From 1993 until October 2, 2012, none of the 
Plaintiffs had made any request for an accounting from 
David. Deel. of David L. Boren. R. 134-138; Depo. of 
Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 82-98, P20 and P37 (did 
not ask for information); and Depo. of Duane Boren Jr., 
R. 118-129, P32 (never ask for accountings). 
13. On October 2, 2012, Daniel Sam, an attorney for 
the Plaintiffs sent a letter asking for information. 
Within two months, the Plaintiffs, through counsel, 
were provided an inventory of the Trust, accountings 
for the Trust and tax returns for 2008 through 2011. 
Since that date, accountings and tax returns for 2012, 
2013 and 2014 have also been provided. Finally, the 
backup documents for the accountings and tax returns 
were made available for examining and copying. Deel. 
of David L. Boren. R. 134-138. 
8 
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14. In 2014, the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. In 
their complaint, the Plaintiffs make numerous 
allegations of improper or illegal acts by David and 
their mother, Mrs. Boren, "upon information and 
belief." R. 1-11. 
15. On January 19 and January 20, 2015, the 
depositions of the Plaintiffs were taken regarding the 
allegations in the complaint. None of the Plaintiffs 
could provide any facts to support the allegations. R. 
82-129. 
16. Paragraph 20 of the Complaint alleges, that the 
Defendants had "stolen and embezzled money from the 
Trust." In response to questions about that 
~ allegation, all four Plaintiffs admitted there were no 
facts to support the allegation. (No I didn't say 
that), Depo. of Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P30 lines 
7 through page 31 line 31; (no facts to support the 
allegation), Depo. of Boren Jr., R. 118-129, Page 22 
~ 
line 12 through 14; ( "no facts" to support the claim), 
Depo. of Mary Ellen Boren Blanchard, R. 110-117, Page 
9 
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26 lines 13 through 16; and ("just speculation"), Depa. 
of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 82-98, P38 lines 6 
through 16. 
17. Paragraph 22 of the Complaint alleges that 
David forged documents. At their depositions, the 
Plaintiffs admitted there were no facts to support that 
claim. Depa. of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 82-98, 
P40; Depa. of Mary Boren Blanchard, R. 110-117, P30; 
Depa. of Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P33; Depa. of 
Duane Boren Jr., R. 118-129, P28. 
18. Paragraph 22 of the Complaint alleges that 
David coerced Mrs. Boren to sign documents. At the 
depositions, the Plaintiffs admitted there were no 
facts to support that claim. All the children also 
agreed that their mother is and was competent. Depa. 
of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 82-98, P30; Depa. Of 
Mary Ellen Boren Blanchard, R. 110-117, P30; Depa. of 
Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P33 lines 13-18; and 
Depa. of Duane Boren Jr., R. 118-129, PSS. 
10 
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19. In addition, Mrs. Boren denied that she has 
been coerced into signing any document. 
Sherron Lea Boren. R. 139. 
Deel. of 
20. Paragraph 23 of the Complaint alleged that 
David gave himself an unauthorized salary, paid for 
equipment for his own needs out of the Trust property, 
and caused a diminution of Trust assets. None of the 
Plaintiffs have any facts or evidence to support this 
allegation. Depa. of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 
82-98, P60 line 4 ("I feel like [twelve hundred dollars 
per month to David to run the farm is fine"); Depa. of 
Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P35 lines 4-6 ("I do not 
know about that.") ; and Depa. of Duane Boren Jr., R. 
118-129, P30 lines 8-20 (claiming the mere fact David 
took a salary showed it was unauthorized). 
21. Paragraph 24 of the Complaint alleged that the 
accountings were untruthful, 
inaccurate and that David had 
unenforceable and 
failed to provide 
receipts and account for monies taken from the Trust 
property. R. 1-11. Similarly, Paragraphs 30 and 35 of 
the Complaint alleged that the Defendants failed to 
keep adequate records, failed to keep the Plaintiffs 
11 
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reasonably informed of the Trust, and failed to provide 
accountings. R. 1-11. 
22. At their depositions, the Plaintiffs admitted 
that they had not looked at the accountings or the 
backup documents provided to them, and that there were 
no facts to support their claims. Depa. of Sharrol Ann 
Boren Anderton, R. 82-98, P20 lines 15-17 (stating she 
did not ask for records before 2012); P22 line 22 
through P23 line 3 (acknowledging she received 
accountings, an inventory of assets, and tax returns); 
P43 line 16 (stating she did not know how the 
accountings were untruthful and inaccurate); PP44-45 
(admitting that she merely "glanced through" the 
documents and put them in her file, but did not 
thoroughly review the accountings or ask for back up 
documents) ; Depa. of Mary Ellen Boren Blanchard, R. 
110-117, P21 lines 16-21 (acknowledging she received ~ 
accountings, tax returns and title reports) ; Depa. of 
Duane Boren Jr., R. 118-129, P20 lines 20-24 (stating 
he did not look at the documents he received from his 
first attorney, but simply put them in a file or sent 
them on to his second attorney); P22 lines 3-11 ~ 
12 
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(admitting he only "skimmed over the documents he 
requested); P32 line 32 (admitting he had never asked 
for an accounting prior to the summer of 2012); P34 
lines 4-9 ( claiming it is not his responsibility to 
review all back-up documentation to the accountings or 
receipts) . 
23. Paragraphs 31 and 32 of the Complaint allege 
that the Trustees did not administer the Trust solely 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries. R. 1-11. 
However, at their dispositions, the Plaintiffs admitted 
that their mother, Mrs. Boren, is presently the only 
income beneficiary. Depo. of Sharrol Ann Boren 
Anderton, R. 82-98, P56 line 21. At Mrs. Boren's 
deposition, she testified that the Trust is being 
administered for her benefit, at her direction, and 
with her input. 
142. 
Deel. of Sherron Lea Boren, R. 139-
24. Paragraphs 33 and 42 of the Complaint allege 
that the Defendants have failed to administer the Trust 
as a prudent person would. 
13 
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Plaintiffs had no proof for those allegations. Depo. 
Of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 82-98, P46 line 2; 
Depo. of Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P38 line 17; and 
De po . of Duane Boren Jr . , R . 118 -12 9 , P 3 9 1 in es 1 6- 2 0 ~ 
(admitting he had no facts to support his "opinion" and 
feelings that David had not acted as a prudent investor 
of the Trust assets). 
25. As a fourth cause of action, the Plaintiffs 
allege that the Defendants "negligently misrepresented 
to the Plaintiffs facts regarding the administration of 
the Trust." R. 1-11. In their depositions, the ~ 
Plaintiffs admitted there were no facts to support that 
cause of action. Depo. of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, 
R. 82-98, PPS0-51; Depo. of Mary Ellen Boren Blanchard, 
R. 110-117, P38 lines 24-25 (admitting that she did not 
have any facts showing that either David or Mrs. Boren 
had made misrepresentations about the Trust); Depo. of 
Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P41 lines 9-12 (admitting 
that her mother had not made any misrepresentations to 
him, as she "had not talked to David"); and Depo. of 
Duane Boren Jr., R. 118-129, P39. 
14 
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26. In fact, two of the Plaintiffs admitted they 
had never talked to David about the Trust or its 
assets. Depa. of Duane Boren Jr., R. 630, P40 line 18; 
and Depa. of Terry Christensen, R. 99-109, P41 line 12. 
27. In an effort to avoid having the case 
dismissed, the Plaintiffs filed a document entitled 
Declaration of Duane Boren Jr., in opposition to the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs attached 370 pages of documents. 
R. 241. 
However, 
the Declaration is signed only by counsel for the 
Plaintiffs, not by Mr. Boren. It consists of 14 
paragraphs (allegations) copied from the Complaint, 
( compare paragraphs 5 through 21 of the Complaint to 
paragraphs 5 through 21 of the Declaration), along with 
unsupported opinions and suppositions. It concludes 
with the statement that the Plaintiffs are going to 
hire an accountant. There is no foundation testimony 
to support or show the admissibility of the 370 pages 
of attached documents nor any explanation as to the 
purpose of those documents. 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28. The trial court struck Junior's Declaration. R. 
710. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiffs do not have standing, and the court 
does not have jurisdiction over this case because 
Plaintiffs' complete interest in the Trust is subject 
to Defendant Mrs. Boren's power of appointment. Thus, 
they do not have a legally protectable interest in this 
controversy. 
2. Plaintiffs do not have standing, and the court 
does not have jurisdiction because the allegations in 
Plaintiff' complaint do not address any of their future 
interests in the Trust. Thus, they do not have a 
legally protectable interest in this controversy. 
3. Neither the facts, the terms of the Trust 
agreement, or the law support the Plaintiffs' 
allegations in their complaint regarding accountings 
and alleged misuse of Trust assets. 
4. Plaintiffs' arguments turn on whether the Court 
properly struck Junior's Declaration. In Plaintiffs' 
depositions, they each agreed there were no facts to 
16 
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support the allegations of their complaint. However, 
Junior subsequently filed a declaration directly 
contradictory to his own testimony, and the other 
plaintiffs' testimony, in an attempt to create an issue 
of fact and avoid summary judgment. None of the other 
Plaintiffs have reversed their testimony. The trial 
court properly struck Junior's declaration. 
5. Junior's declaration contains no explanation as 
to why he is contradicting his deposition testimony, as 
required by case law. The declaration contains 
allegations copied from the complaint, as well as 
suppositions and opinions which are inadmissible. To 
have accepted the declaration would have allowed the 
Plaintiffs to ignore the discovery process. The trial 
court properly exercised its discretion when it struck 
the declaration. 
~ 6. The Defendants were appropriately awarded their 
legal fees and costs by the trial court; as prevailing 
parties, they should be awarded the fees they have 
~ 
incurred on this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING 
'' [SJ tanding is a jurisdictional requirement that 
must be satisfied before a court may entertain a ~ 
controversy between two parties. Under the traditional 
test for standing, the interests of the parties must be 
adverse and the parties seeking relief must have a 
legally protectable interest in the controversy." 
Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, P 12, 154 P.3d 808, 811 
(alteration in original) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted}; see also, Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("[T]he moving party 
must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the ~ 
court.") . Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT 
App 146, P8, 184 P.3d 610, P612. 
"Either party, or the court on its own motion, may 
properly raise the issue of standing for the first time 
on appeal." Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Utah 
App. 1990}, cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); 
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accord, Terracor v. Utah Ed. Of State Lands, 716 P.2d 
796, 798 (Utah 1986) (stating that appeals court can 
address standing issue sua sponte); and Sierra Club v. 
Department of Envtl. Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 
App . 19 9 3 ) ( same ) . 
Here, Appellants lack standing to bring this case 
before the court, as they do not meet both required 
parts of the test, which are: 
1.The interests of the parties must be adverse; 
and 
2.The parties seeking relief must have a legally 
protectable interest in the controversy. 
~ Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146, 
PB, 184 P.3d 610, 612. Specifically, the Appellants do 
not have a legally protectable interest in the 
controversy based on either of the following two 
arguments. 
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1. Appellants Lack Standing Because Settlor Granted 
His Spouse the Power of Appointment to Change the 
Terms of the Trust. 
Appellants lack standing because their father, the 
settlor, included a provision in his Trust that granted ~ 
their mother, Defendant Mrs. Boren power of 
appointment; thus, they do not have a legally 
protectable interest in the Trust. The power of 
appointment granted to Mrs. Boren is broad. It gives 
her the ability to change the Trust drastically, to the 
point of completely disinheriting each of Appellants. 
R. 150. This power makes Appellants' interest 
contingent upon future events. Thus, Appellants are 
not presently current beneficiaries. 
Moreover, regardless whether Appellants were 
current beneficiaries, the mere existence of the power 
of appointment means Appellants do not have standing. 
See, Montrone v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 875 P.2d 551, 
557 (Utah App. 1994). 
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In Montrone, summary judgement was granted and 
affirmed because the trial court found that the 
Plaintiff/beneficiary lacked standing to bring the suit 
to demand an accounting of the Trust, as the Settlor 
retained the power of appointment. As such, the 
beneficiary's interest was subject to that power and 
could change or be eliminated. In Montrone, the 
Settlor chose to instruct the trustee not to provide an 
accounting to any of the beneficiaries, which was her 
right given the fact had power of appointment over the 
Plaintiffs' interests in the trust. Id. at 551. 
The legislators stated in Utah Code Ann. §75-1-108, 
"For purposes of consenting to modification ... of a 
trust or to deviation from its terms, the sole holder . 
of a presently exercisable general power of 
appointment, including one in the form of a power of 
amendment . [is] deemed to act for beneficiaries to 
the extent their interest are subject to the 
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power." Based thereon, the Montrone Court, quoting the 
editorial board of the Utah Code found, 
Under §75-1-108, the holder of a general power 
of appointment or of revocation can negate the 
trustee's duties to any other person." We 
recognize the important public policy of 
holding trustees accountable to beneficiaries 
for the administration of a trust. However, it 
is also important that a trustee not 
unnecessarily deplete trust funds by being 
required to account to every contingent or 
remote beneficiary whose interest is subject to 
a power of revocation by a living settler. 
This policy is at the heart of Section 75-1-
108. 
Id., at 558-559 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Trust grants Appellee, Mrs. Boren, 
complete power over Appellants' interest in the Trust, 
including the power of revocation of that interest. 
The entire principal of the trust shall be 
distributed to or for the benefit of any one or 
more of Settlor's issue or Spouses of Settlor's 
deceased issue, as Settlor' s Spouse shall 
appoint by exercise of a testamentary exclusive 
special power of appointment, which power shall 
be exercised by a will made after Settlor' s 
death which specifically refers to the power of 
appointment herein given to Settlor' s Spouse. 
Any appointment by Settlor's Spouse may be of 
such estates and interest and upon such terms, 
trusts, conditions, powers and limitations as 
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Settlor's Spouse shall determine. Any 
appointment may exclude any one or more of the 
beneficiaries of the class. If, or to the 
extent that, Settlor's Spouse does not exercise 
said testamentary special power of appointment 
at the death of Settlor' s Spouse, said 
principal shall pass according to the terms 
governing ultimate distribution set forth in 
Paragraph 7 of the Joinder Agreement. 
The Duane Boren Family Living Trust, R. 150. 
This power of appointment is not held by a "living 
settlor," nor is it a "general" power of appointment; 
however, Mrs. Boren' s special power of appointment is 
so broad that the Appellants' complete future interest 
is subject to her granted powers. As such, Mrs. 
Boren's power has the same effect over Appellants' 
interests as a general power of appointment, and 
prevents the appellants from having a legally 
protectable interest in this controversy. 
Just as the Plaintiff in Montrone did not have 
standing to bring suit against the trustee, the 
Appellants in this case do not have standing to bring 
suit against a trust in which their interests are 
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subject to their mother's ability to completely 
disinherit them at any time she so chooses. 
2. Appellants Lack Standing Because They Do Not Have 
Interest in the Trust for the Causes of Action 
Raised in Their Complaint. ~ 
Appellants do not have the necessary interests in 
the Duane Boren Family Living Trust for the causes of 
action raised in their Complaint, which all surround 
the general operation of the farm and on accounting for 
farm expenses and assets. 
In Appellants' Brief, Statement of Facts, number 19 
reports to be providing allocation information from the 
Trust, and states: 
The Family Trust portion includes the principal 
of an undivided one-half (1/2) interest of 
property and mineral interests, to be 
administered in equal shares to the 
beneficiaries, Trustor' s six (6) children, 
DAVID L. BOREN, DUANE BOREN, JR., SHARROL ANN 
BOREN nka SHARROL ANN ANDERSON, MARY BOREN nka 
MARY BLANCHARD, and TERRY BOREN nka TERRY 
CHRISTENSE. Rec 000166. 
However, this is not an accurate statement of the 
allocation of Trust assets. Rather, the Second 
Amendment to the Trust Agreement, executed by the ~ 
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Settlor on August 28, 1990, prior to his death, changed 
the distribution of the Trust assets to the following: 
R. 165. 
(1) Trustee shall distribute all agricultural 
equipment, all livestock, all water rights and 
the surface rights to all cultivated, pasture 
or hay ground (all real estate other than 
"waste ground") to DAVID LEN BOREN and LUCKY J. 
BOREN in equal shares, per stirpes. 
(2) Trustee shall distribute all "waste 
ground" in four (4) equal shares among SHARROL 
ANN ANDERTON, DUANE BOREN, JR., MARY ELLEN 
BLANCHARD and TERRY LEE MONKS in per stirpes 
shares. 
(3) Trustee shall distribute all mineral 
rights as follows: Fifty percent (50%) shall be 
distributed equally to DAVID LEN BOREN and 
LUCKY J. BOREN in per stirpes shares. The 
remaining fifty percent (50%) shall be 
distributed equally among Settlor' s following 
four (4) children: SHARROL ANN ANDERTON, DUANE 
BOREN, JR., MARY ELLEN BLANCHARD and TERRY LEE 
MONKS. 
( 4) Trustee 
residue and 
equal shares 
named above, 
the children 
share shall 
stirpes. 
shall distribute all the rest, 
remainder of the estate in six (6) 
among Settlor' s six (6) children 
with the provision that if any of 
are not then surviving, his or her 
pass to his or her issue per 
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In simpler terms, David Boren and his deceased 
brother's heirs have received all rights to the farm, 
equipment, livestock, water rights and surface rights 
to the farm, including all cultivated, pasture or hay ~ 
ground. The only interests in the Trust assets 
allocated to the Appellants are the "waste ground," 50% 
of the mineral rights, and the rest, residue, and 
remainder of the estate, excluding the farm. See, 
Second Amendment to The Duane Boren Family Living 
Trust, R. 16 6 . 
Given Appellants lack of any interest in the farm, 
they do not have standing to complaint about its 
operation. 
The waste ground and mineral rights remain 
available to be distributed to the Plaintiffs on their 
mother's death; if she does not exercise her power of 
appointment. 
As for the rest, residue, and remainder, it is 
impossible for Appellants to have a current interest in 
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the rest, residue, and remainder of the estate, as it 
is unknown if there will be any rest or residue on 
remainder after their mother's death. Regardless, even 
if Mrs. Boren does not exercise her powers of 
appointment and disinherit Appellants; they have only a 
future interest in the "waste ground" and the mineral 
rights, they have no interest in the farm. 
Plaintiffs lack any standing to complain about 
accountings and records regarding property that they do 
not have an interest in. See, Haymond v. Bonneville 
Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, PB, 89 P. 3d 
171, 173-174. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 
789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); and Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). 
The facts and evidence are to be viewed in the light 
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most favorable to the nonmoving party. American Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 
1989). 
In the case at hand, the issue before the trial ~ 
court on Defendants' summary judgement motion was 
simply whether Appellants had provided evidence to 
support their claims, sufficient to proceed to trial. 
The trial court found that the Appellants had not 
provided sufficient evidence, based on the facts before 
it and the standard set forth in Webster v. Sill. As 
the Webster Court stated, "The mere assertion that an 
issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary 
foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to ~ 
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion." 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
Appellants' Complaint asserted a variety of claims. 
The case went through discovery, including depositions 
of each of the Plaintiffs, and ended with the trial 
court granting Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion. At 
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no time during this process did Plaintiffs provide 
proper evidentiary foundation to support the assertions 
in their Complaint, thus the court properly granted 
summary judgment, dismissing the case. 
Appellants' have asked this Court to review the 
trial court's decision based on the facts in the 
record; however in the next sentence they complain that 
the trial court provided limited legal analysis' of 
their claims and instead relied on the Court's finding 
that no admissible evidence existed. Appellant's 
Brief, P36. Appellees agree that this Court's review 
should be focused on the facts in the record. 
The Plaintiffs each admitted in their respective 
depositions that they had no evidence to support any of 
the claims in their complaint R. 710-719. Discovery 
ended on May 30, 2015. R. 25. However, after the 
deadline for discovery, in objection to the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Junior submitted an 
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affidavit contradicting his deposition testimony. R. 
214-220. 
Ru 1 e 5 6 ( c ) ( 4 ) , Utah R . Ci v . Pro . , requires that 
"[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or ~ 
oppose a motion 
admissible in evidence 
set out facts that would be 
" ( emphasis added) . See 
also, Shiozawa v. Duke, 2015 UT App 40, PP16-17, 305 
P.3d 1174, 1181, and D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 
420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 701 states, 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, 
testimony in the form of an opinion is limited 
to one that is: 
(a) rationally based on the witness's 
perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the 
witness's testimony or to determining a 
fact in issue; and 
( C) not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702. 
~ 
~ 
See also, State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, PP26-27, ~ 
248 P.3d 70, 80. 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 401 states, 
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Evidence is relevant if: 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the 
evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining 
the action. 
Appellants claim in their Brief that Junior's 
Declaration and supporting exhibits provided admissible 
facts, sufficient to overcome summary judgment. 
However, as trial court correctly points out, Junior's 
Declaration did not set forth facts that would be 
admissible as evidence under Rules 701 or 401. See, 
Utah R. Evict. Rule 701 and 401. 
Rather, Junior's Declaration was full of 
unsupported suppositions, conclusions, and opinion 
testimony by a lay witness; none of which offered 
anything to help the fact-finder understand or 
determine any claimed fact at issue. 
Additionally, the Declaration directed the trial 
court to documents without providing any foundational 
information for these documents, and without explaining 
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how those documents were relevant or supported Junior's 
opinions and suppositions. 
Further, Junior's opinions were based on supposed 
specialized knowledge of tax returns and accounting. 
Under Utah R. Evict. Rule 702, such matters require the 
opinion of an expert; however, Junior was qualified 
only as a lay witness. Thus, such opinions were 
inadmissible under Utah R. Evict. Rule 701. 
The test for determining whether testimony must be 
provided by an expert is "whether an average bystander 
would be able to provide the same testimony." State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, P34, 147 P.3d 1176, 1185-
1186. 
In his declaration, Junior opines that (1) David, 
prior to the commencement of this litigation 
"consistently operated the Farm at a substantial loss," 
Id., at P30; (2) "[t] he losses to the Family Trust were 
incurred by Defendant David L. Boren, because he was 
using the Family Trust to pay the expenses of the whole 
Farm while he reaped the individual financial benefit 
of the Farm," Id., at P31; and (3) David's bookkeeping 
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was "sloppy and incomplete." 
Junior insinuates that there 
Id., 
have 
at P33. Moreover, 
been instances of 
"financial malfeasance," and speculates that more will 
be uncovered when an expert completes a review of the 
records David provided in his accounting. Id., at P34. 
An average bystander would be hard pressed to 
evaluate loses, financial maleficent, personal 
financial benefit, and computations of book keeping 
without specialized knowledge of tax returns or 
accounting. Thus, the court correctly found that under 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 701, Junior's opinions were 
inadmissible. See, Rothlisberger, 2006 UT App 49, P29, 
147 P.3d 1176, 1184. 
Plaintiffs did not obtain the help of an expert 
prior to discovery closing. 
The trial court found that, not only did Junior's 
Declaration fail to provide any facts to support the 
asserted claims in the complaint, but it contradicted 
Junior's own deposition testimony. R. 710. This issue 
will be discussed later. 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In conclusion, the trial court addressed the 
assertions in Junior's Declaration and found that each 
of them lacked evidentiary support. As a result, the 
trial court correctly concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment, 
even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff. 
1. Appellants Provided no Relevant Evidence in 
Support of Their Claim That a Trust Accounting 
Did Not Occur. 
Junior argued that Defendants failed to provide a 
Trust accounting, under Utah Code Ann. §75-7-103. 
However, based on the deposition testimony of the other 
Plaintiffs, the court found that the Defendants had, in ~ 
fact, provided Trust accountings. R. 717. 
Junior's only exhibit supporting his accusation to 
the contrary was his own request for an accounting, 
dated October 2, 2012. R. 136. However, this request 
did not constitute evidence that an accounting was 
withheld. Rather, his own and other testimony 
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established that after the accounting was requested, it 
was provided. Thus, summary judgement on this issue 
was appropriate. 
When the Trust was funded in 1993 and David was 
named as trustee, Utah Code Ann. §75-7-303 {3) stated, 
"Upon reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to 
a statement of the accounts of the trust annually and 
on termination of the trust or change of the trustee." 
Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that they 
never requested an accounting until 2012, at which time 
accountings and tax returns for 2008 through 2012 were 
provided. Plaintiffs testified that they did not 
review the accounting provided in 2012, 2013 or 2014, 
either prior to, or following, the filing of their 
complaint. Plaintiffs' Depo. of Sharrol Ann Boren 
Anderton, R. 82-89, P22 line 22 through P23 line 3 
{acknowledging she received accountings); Depo. of Mary 
Ellen Boren Blanchard, R. 110-117, P21 lines 16-21 
(acknowledging she received accountings); and Depo. of 
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Duane Boren Jr., R. 118-129, P22 lines 3-11 {admitting 
he only "skimmed over the documents"). 
No. 19, supra. 
See also, Fact 
If the Plaintiffs had additional requests for ~ 
information beyond the hundreds of pages they received 
in 2012, then they could have sought those answers 
through another informal request, or through discovery. 
Even though the Plaintiffs received an accounting, 
they were not entitled to it, according to the Trust 
Agreement. The Trust specifies what accounting is to 
be provided, stating: 
Accounting by Trustee. The Trustee shall keep 
all accounts and records of the trusts created 
herein and annually, or oftener, shall render 
to the current income beneficiaries statements 
showing all receipts, disbursements, and 
distributions of both principal and income of 
the trust estate. 
Paragraph 9 of the Trust R. 154 {emphasis added}. 
Defendant Mrs. Boren is, and has always been, the 
only income beneficiary. She testified to having 
received and approved the required accountings. See, 
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trust Document paragraph 9 of the Trust R. 154 and 
deposition of Ms. Boren. R. 139-142. Plaintiffs are 
merely contingent beneficiaries; no annual accounting 
is granted to them by the Trust. Regardless, as all 
Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions, an accounting 
was provided to them shortly after their request in 
2012, and has been provided annually since their 
initial request. 
The trial court appropriately granted summary 
judgment on the issue of a Trust accounting, as 
Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to support 
their claim, and a Trust accounting was provided to 
Plaintiffs (even though it was not required by the 
Trust) . 
2. Appellants Provided No Relevant Evidence to 
Support Their Breach of Trust Claim. 
Appellants have attempted to argue their claims, as 
opposed to focusing on the true issue of whether 
summary judgement was appropriate due to the lack of 
supporting evidence for those claims. 
37 
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court noted, "The mere assertion that an issue of fact 
exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to 
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the 
granting of a summary judgment motion." Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
Defendants all admitted in their depositions that 
they had no evidence to support their breach of trust 
claims. Depa. of Sharrol Ann Boren Anderton, R. 82 
P47; Dep. of Mary Blanchard, R. 110, P36; Depa. of 
Terry Christensen, R. 99, P39; and Depa. of Duane Boren 
Jr., R. 118, P36. They further admitted there were no 
facts showing any reduction in the value of the Trust 
assets. Depa. of Duane Bowen Jr., R. 628, P31. 
Then, in his Declaration, Junior offers mere 
assertions that an issues of fact exist, for example he 
said, 
After reviewing the information provided by the 
attorney for the Trustee, it is apparent that 
Defendant David L. Boren has used the assets of 
the Family Trust for his own benefit in 
violation of fiduciary duty to the remaining 
beneficiaries. 
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Depo. of Duane Boren Jr., R. 118, P20. 
Junior referred to his Exhibits F-I as support for 
his claims. Exhibit F is the Farm Agreement, which 
specifies terms for operating the farm, 
compensation for running it. Trust, R. 249-250. 
and 
No 
explanation of how these documents allegedly supported 
Plaintiff's claims was provided; as such, the trial 
court appropriately found they did not support 
Plaintiff's claim for breach of trust. 
Exhibit G is a copy of the Trust account and income 
and expense reports for the Trust prepared by David and 
approved by Mrs. Boren. There is nothing in those 
reports that supports Plaintiffs' claims. Nor did 
Junior explain the relevance of those documents or 
provide foundation for them. R. 254-295. 
Exhibit H contains copies of commitments for title 
insurance for the various sections of land in the farm, 
which show the appropriate percentage owned by the 
Trust. Again, no explanation was given to how these 
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documents supposedly support Plaintiffs' claims. R. 
299. 
Exhibit I is a copy of several checks written from 
the Trust bank account which Plaintiffs assert support ~ 
their claim that farm equipment was leased from David 
L. Boren, despite the allegation that the farm 
previously owned the farm equipment. However, no 
evidence was submitted establishing what equipment the 
payment was for; establishing who owned that particular 
equipment; or in any other way suggesting wrongful 
payment from the Trust's account. 
Exhibit I, attached to this brief. 
See, Plaintiff's 
In paragraph 26 of Junior's declaration, he claims ~ 
that the Trust paid 100% of the costs for Defendant 
David L. Boren's labor and the lease of the equipment; 
Junior provided Exhibit J as evidence of this alleged 
wrongdoing. His statement is an unsupported 
conclusion, as Exhibit J is a bill from the Bureau of 
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Land Management that has nothing to do with labor or 
equipment costs. R. 424-426. 
In paragraph 27 of Junior's declaration, he claims 
that Defendant David L. Boren used trust assets to 
inappropriately purchase items for his personal use. 
He provided Exhibit K as supposed evidence of these 
purchases. Exhibit K is merely an unmarked page from 
what appears to be a bank account; presumably, the 
Trust bank account. R. 428. The account shows the 
purchase of a 4-wheeler; however, there is no evidence 
that the 4-wheeler was purchased for David L. Boren, as 
opposed to being purchased for the Trust. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G reflects Ms. Boren approved of 
this expenditure. See, Exhibit G, R. 272-295. 
Paragraphs 28-31 contain unsupported conclusions 
made by Junior. These conclusions refer to Exhibit L 
for support. Exhibit L contains the Trust tax returns 
from 2008 through 2014. No explanation is provided to 
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show how these tax returns supposedly support a claim 
for breach of trust. 
In short, Plaintiffs did not provide foundation for 
the evidence they submitted or an explanation of the ~ 
relevance of those exhibits, as required in Rule 401. 
Utah R. of Evid. Rule 401. Further the documents do 
not appear to support Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, 
Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of their claim 
for breach of trust, and summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
3. Appellants Failed to Show Any Wrongdoing in the 
Operation of the Farm. 
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court acknowledged 
that Defendant, David Born, "commingled his own assets, 
in livestock and land, with the Trust," and that it 
found there was nothing illegal about this commingling. 
Appellants' Brief pg. 37. However, this is not an 
accurate statement of the trial court's findings. The 
trial court found, "there is no showing by the 
Plaintiffs that Defendant's actions are unlawful," and 
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"Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to show any 
wrongdoing on the part of the Defendants in their 
operation of the farm." R. 718. 
Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that there 
was no evidence of commingling. Depo. of Sharrol 
Anderton, R. 82 P47; Depo. of Mary Blanchard, R. 110 
P36; Depa. of Terry Christensen, R. 99 P39; and Depo. 
of Duane Boren Jr., R. 118 P36. 
Junior's declaration makes claims regarding a Farm 
Agreement, Defendants' cattle grazing on the farm, and 
the lease of farm equipment. He provided Exhibits F-I, 
as outlined above, as support for his assertion that 
Defendants illegally commingled personal property with 
Trust property. However, these exhibits do nothing to 
support Junior's claim. No foundation for the 
relevance of these exhibits was provided by Junior and 
his statements are merely unsupported conclusions and 
suppositions. 
There is nothing in Junior's Declaration explaining 
the purpose of the 370 pages, nor was there any expert 
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testimony analyzing the documents, nor is it possible 
to simply divine the intended meaning of those 
documents. See, Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, P22-24, 
816 Ut. Adv. Rep 4 0 (party must explain relevance of 
exhibit to summary judgment motion). 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment, 
as all the Plaintiffs admitted, under oath, that they 
had no facts to support their complaint, and Junior's 
Declaration did not provide any admissible evidence to ~ 
the contrary. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY STRUCK DUANE BOREN, JR.'S 
DECLARATION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
striking Junior's declaration, unless it finds that the 
trial court abused its "broad grant of discretion;" or, 
in other words, if "there was no evidentiary basis for 
the trial court's ruling." Murdock, 1999 UT 39, P25, 
9862 P.2d 65, 72; and Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 2013 
UT App 255, P4, 314 P.3d 1069, 1071. 
In this case, as mentioned above, each of the 
Plaintiffs, including Junior, 
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depositions that they had no facts to support the 
allegations in their complaint. However, when faced 
with Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Junior 
filed a declaration attempting to contradict that 
testimony. Declaration of Duane Boren Jr., R. 214. 
None of the other Plaintiffs have rescinded their 
deposition testimony. 
In considering Junior's declaration, the trial 
court held: 
"The Plaintiffs allege that Duane Boren Jr. had 
only skimmed the documents concerning the Trust, 
and was relying on counsel to review the documents 
and find the facts to support his claim. 
The problem with the Plaintiffs' argument is that 
it promotes a deponent' s ignorance during a 
deposition when he is subject to cross examination. 
According to Plaintiffs, by merely claiming no 
knowledge during a deposition, a person could later 
provide his statement through affidavit, without 
the threat of cross examination. The Court finds 
that the general rule outlined in Webster was not 
intended to create such a result. A person cannot 
avoid being deposed and avoid answering questions 
by claiming no knowledge, only to subsequently file 
a self-serving affidavit in order to avoid summary 
judgment. The Court also finds that Duane Boren 
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Jr. did take a clear position in 
His position was he had no facts 
claims. 
his deposition. 
to support his 
R. 710. 
The trial court's ruling striking Junior's 
Declaration should be affirmed for the following 
reasons: 1) the declaration contradicts the deposition ~ 
testimony; 2) the declaration contains no explanation 
as to the reason it contradicts the deposition 
testimony; 3) to allow one to claim ignorance at their 
deposition and then submit a declaration once discovery 
is completed violates the rules and policies regarding 
discovery; and 4) the declaration consists of 
inadmissible opinions and suppositions, as previously 
discussed. 
1. Duane Boren Jr. Attempted to Contradict His 
Deposition and Declaration Testimonies. 
When a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition that is not modified on cross-
examination he may not thereafter raise an 
issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition, unless he can 
provide an explanation of the discrepancy. 
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Legacy Res .. , Inc.. v.. Liberty Pioneer Energy Source, 
Inc .. , 2013 UT 76, P29 n .. 10, 322 P .. 3d 683, 690; and 
Webster v .. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
Here, Junior took a clear position in his 
deposition. Junior's deposition testimony was that he 
had not reviewed any of the accountings, tax returns, 
or inventory and back-up documents he had been 
provided. Therefore, he had no information and no 
facts to support the Complaint. This was consistent 
with the deposition testimony of his sisters, the other 
Plaintiffs. Like the plaintiff in Webster, Junior 
testified directly on the issues of the case, several 
times. 
Defendants' attorneys went through every allegation 
in the Complaint and asked what facts Junior had to 
support each of those allegations of his complaint. 
Junior responded by admitting, among other things, that 
he had no idea who the Trustee was, (R. 622 (p.5 
through 7 of Junior's deposition)), that he was not 
involved in the probate of the estate, (R. 622 (p.5 of 
Junior's deposition)), that he never requested any 
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information until October 2012 (R. 628-629 (PP32-36 of 
Junior's deposition)), 
accountings, inventory, 
provided to him (R. 625, 
that he had not read the 
or tax returns that were 
629 {PP20-22, and 33-34 of 
Junior's deposition)), that he was not aware of what 
assets were distributed by the court to the Trustee (R. 
626 (P24 of Junior's deposition)), that he had no facts 
to support his claim that David had acted imprudently 
as an investor (R. 630 (P39 of Junior's deposition)), 
and that he had no facts to support the allegations in 
the complaint, (R. 626-627, and 631 (PP22-26 and 41 of 
Junior's deposition)). 
Junior only changed an answer once, when David's 
attorney asked follow-up questions to those posed by 
Sherron's attorney. His only change was that his 
earlier statement, that he agreed with "most" of the 
Complaint, should be changed to show that he agreed 
with "all" of the Complaint. R. 637 (P66 of Junior's 
deposition). There were no other modifications to 
Junior's answers that would have made his statements 
unclear. See, Magana v. Dave Roth Constr., 2009 UT 45, 
P39, 215 P.3d 143, 152. Junior had the opportunity to 
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review his deposition after it was printed; however, he 
signed it without making changes. 
As Junior's deposition testimony and his 
Declaration contradicted one another, the trial court 
properly exercised its broad discretion in granting the 
Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration. 
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT 
App 255, P4, 314 P.3d 1069, 1071. 
2 • The Declaration Contains No Explanation for the 
Change in Testimony. 
The law requires that any explanation for a change 
in testimony be included in the declaration that seeks 
to contradict the deposition. See, Legacy Res., Inc., 
2013 UT at P29 n.10, 322 P.3d 683, 690. 
Appellants argue that the circumstances in this 
case are like the facts in Gaw v. State, where the 
trial court used the rule in Webster to strike an 
affidavit objecting to Summary Judgment because the 
affidavit contained discrepancies from the affiant's 
deposition, and the Court of Appeals found the trial 
court's decision to be in error. 
P.2d 1130, 1140 (Utah App. 1990). 
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However, in Gaw, the court found that Gaw had 
provided an explanation for the discrepancies between 
his deposition and his affidavit. The trial court had 
apparently not believed Gaw's explanation, However, the 
Court of Appeals held that "As long as it [the 
explanation] is plausible, the fact finder should be 
allowed to weigh the credibility of the explanation." 
Id., at 1140. 
The Gaw Court cited Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone to 
exemplify its ruling. Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 
1141, (Utah App. 1990) (citing, Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 894 
( 5th Cir. 198 0) ) . In Bone, the af fiant' s affidavit 
explained 
under the 
concerned 
another." 
that the deposition responses were "given 
mistaken assumption that the questions 
one document when they in fact concerned 
Id., at 1140. The Bone Court found the 
explanation to be "at least plausible." Id., at 887. 
Unlike the facts in Gaw and Bone, where the court 
found the explanations given to be at least plausible, 
Junior did not provide any explanation for the 
contradiction between his deposition and declaration 
testimony. 
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The Utah Supreme Court looks for the explanation in 
the affidavit itself, absent which the deposition 
testimony is taken as being undisputed. See, Legacy 
Res., Inc., 2013 UT P29 n.10, 322 P.3d 683, 690 
([Plaintiff company's president] 's affidavit offered no 
such explanation, so we take as undisputed his 
deposition statement that he offered input on marketing 
materials.); Magana v. Dave Roth Constr., 2009 UT 45, 
P39 n. 33, 215 P.3d 143, 152 ("In a subsequent 
affidavit, [the plaintiff] explained that in regard to 
his answer that he was not sure whether he saw someone 
help rig the load, there was either a miss-translation 
~ or he had misunderstood the question."); and Webster, 
675 P.2d at 1173 ("The Plaintiffs' affidavit wholly 
failed to explain the discrepancy between the 
deposition and the affidavit."). 
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Similarly, in Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, 
stating, 
[T] he district court correctly held that for 
purposes of the parties' motions for summary 
judgment, [the plaintiff]'s affidavit, as a 
matter of law, cannot contradict his prior 
sworn statement and testimony, which was clear 
and unequivocal, because the affidavit fails to 
state an adequate reason for the contradiction. 
Brinton, 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998); 
In this case, Junior's declaration contradicted his 
deposition testimony. Instead of explaining this 
discrepancy under oath, as the law requires, Junior's 
declaration failed to address the contradiction. 
The only explanation for the contradiction is ~ 
contained in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Motion to Strike. The explanation, by Junior's 
counsel, was that Junior "had only skimmed over the 
documents that he had been provided" and that he "was 
relying on his attorney to review the documents. fl 
R. 668. However, this is not an explanation for the 
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contradiction; rather, it is an excuse that was offered 
outside of Junior's declaration, contrary to the 
requirements of the law. 
Further, Junior had the accountings and tax returns 
in the fall of 2012. He subsequently filed this 
lawsuit in 2014. When Junior filed his declaration on 
June 29, 2015, the discovery cutoff date of May 30, 
2015 had passed. R. 25. Both Junior and his attorney 
had an obligation to review the relevant documents 
prior to filing a lawsuit. See, Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
11 (b) . The district court, therefore, did not abuse 
its discretion in striking Junior's declaration or in 
subsequently dismissing the case. Rather, it strictly 
adhered to the law. 
3 . Allowing Duane Boren, Jr.'s Declaration Would 
Undermine the Purposes of Discovery, Depositions, 
and Summary Judgment Motions. 
To allow Plaintiffs' declaration based on his 
attorney's explanation for the discrepancies would 
defeat the purpose of discovery and depositions, and 
the reason for summary judgment motions. 
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675 P.2d at 1173. Courts that have considered 
arguments similar to the Plaintiffs' have rejected 
those arguments. See, Tra co Steel Erectors, Inc. v. 
Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, P38, 175 P.3d 572, 579- ~ 
580 (holding that a deponent making a mistake in a 
deposition is not sufficient reason to consider a 
declaration that contradicts the deposition testimony). 
In this case, Junior claimed lack of knowledge at 
this deposition, stating he had not reviewed the 
accountings and had no facts to support his claims. 
After the discovery deadline had passed and motions for 
summary judgment were filed, he then filed a 
declaration attempting to contradict his own testimony ~ 
that he had no facts to support the complaint. 
However, Junior had the accountings and relevant 
information in 2012. He had more than adequate time to 
hire an accountant to review the documents for any 
wrongdoing. 
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Junior's repeated allegations of malfeasance 
against his brother and his own mother are reckless, if 
not defamatory, given his decision not to review the 
documents he was given in 2012 to determine if his 
accusations had merit. Such actions should not be 
condoned by this Court; rather, the trial court's 
decision to strike Junior's declaration should be 
affirmed. 
IV. 
1. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Trial Court Appropriately Awarded Defendants 
Attorney Fees. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-1004(1) states, 
In a judicial proceeding involving the 
administration of a trust, the court may, as 
justice and equity may require, award costs and 
expenses including reasonable attorney's fees, 
to any party, to be paid by another party ... 
The Utah Supreme Court case, Shurtleff v. In re 
United Effort Plan Trust (In re United Effort Plan 
Trust), is directly on point, as it pertains to legal 
fees in this case. Shurtleff, 2012 UT 47, P23, 289 P.3d 
408, 415-16. The Court in Shurtleff found that in 
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order to determine how the term "justice and equity" 
applies, 
factors: 
Id. 
(a) 
(b) 
( C) 
( d) 
( e) 
the court should analyze the 
reasonableness of the parties' 
contentions, or defenses; 
unnecessarily prolonging litigation; 
following 
claims, 
relative ability to bear the financial burden; 
result obtained by the litigation and 
prevailing party concepts; and 
whether a party has acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons in the bringing or conduct of the 
litigation. 
Here, the trial court analyzed the Shurtleff 
factors and found that the Defendants were "clearly the 
prevailing party," that all of Plaintiffs' claims had 
been dismissed, that there was no evidence to support 
the Plaintiffs' claims, that Plaintiffs had failed to 
reasonably investigate their claims and had not even 
reviewed the accountings, tax returns and other 
information provided to them prior to filing the 
lawsuit, and their claims were without merit. R. 815. 
Based on those findings, the court awarded the 
Defendants the legal fees and costs they had incurred. 
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In this case, the Plaintiffs concede that the trial 
court appropriately used the Shurtleff factors. They 
ask only that the decision be reversed if the trial 
court' s Ruling and Order are reversed. However, the 
trial court's ruling was 
affirmed, as should its' 
correct and should be 
finding that equity and 
justice would be served by awarding attorney fees to 
the Defendants. 
2 . The Defendants Should be Awarded Their Attorney 
Fees for the Necessity of Defending Against this 
Appeal. 
The trial court awarded Defendants their legal fees 
and costs incurred defending against the Plaintiffs' 
claims. Rec. 815, 8 5 2, 8 5 7 . The established rule is 
that the Appellate Court is to award the prevailing 
party the fees incurred on appeal when that party was 
awarded fees in the underling case. See, Warner v. 
Warner, 2014 UT App 16, P63, 319 P.3d 711, 732. 
However, Appellees should be awarded the fees they have 
incurred in defending against this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellees, David L. Boren and Mrs. Boren, request 
that this Court dismiss this case, based on Appellants' 
lack of standing; or in the alternative, that this 
Court affirm the trial court's ruling on Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment; and that this Court award 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this (-1:!!ctay of September, 2016. 
Attorne~vfor the Appellees 
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SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL 
Appellees respectfully submit the foregoing by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record, Sherri L. Walton, on this the September 12, 2016. 
H~u ~an~ ~n;lLLC ~~~--s ERRJ L. WALTON 
Attorney/or the Appellees 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellee requests oral argument in order to answer questions concerning 
the arguments above. 
DATED: September 12, 2016. 
Attorney for the Appellees 
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